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Sun & Firestone [1] argue that the Dark Room Problem poses an important challenge 
to the ambitions of predictive processing accounts – specifically, they worry that a 
standard response threatens the story with triviality, asserting merely that  
prediction-driven agents avoid dark, food-free corners because they ‘predict that 
they will not stay in them’.  
 
In response, we wish to highlight the principled role of ‘optimistic predictions’. Our 
predictive models can [must] be optimistically biased, in that the distribution of 
expected states is realised, when we act upon the world. For example, the model may 
include interoceptive expectations on adequate glucose levels throughout a famine.  
These allostatic predictions are deep-set, ingrained in low-level structural 
mechanisms (and underwrite foraging for food). But optimistic predictions occur at 
higher-levels and in more flexible ways too. For example, placebo response flows 
from confident expectations of relief, whose effects reach all the way down to spinal 
cord responses [2]. Crucially, such effects vary when experimenters manipulate 
subjects’ confidence, altering the precision with which they predict relief [3]. Yet 
expect too much and rapid disappointment (and downgrading of precision over 
future expectations) follows. Effective predictive processing agents must form 
optimistic yet sufficiently realistic expectations about their own future states and 
behaviors. Technically, posterior beliefs are the optimal mixture of prior optimism 
and sensory evidence. 
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As James observed [4], the evidence as to whether a belief is true often only becomes 
accessible after first adopting the belief without evidence. One empirical 
consequence of this is the Dunning-Kruger effect, the finding that most people 
consider their competence on a complex task as above average. Clinical depression 
seems to be associated with both greater realism and diminished motivation [5] 
suggesting an adaptively valuable trade-off between epistemic accuracy and 
optimistic prediction. While not classically rational, it is the optimistic slant [6] that 
leads us, as aspirational – and curious – beings, out of the dark corners of the world. 
This is not simply because we think we are curious – we are curious because we think; 
i.e., form beliefs about the epistemic and conative consequences of our actions.  
 
The prediction error minimization principle is simultaneously epistemic and conative 
(motivational). Indeed, there is no essential difference between goals or desires and 
beliefs or predictions on this account [7]. Sun and Firestone (following Klein [8]) 
worry that this yields a new puzzle, about when to resolve error by altering the world 
and when to resolve error by altering expectations. This is largely solved by the 
special poise of precise proprioceptive predictions to engage bodily action [7]. More 
generally, expectations about when to resolve error by update versus action 
themselves form part of the generative model. 
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How explanatory is PP? Suppose we ask, using Sun & Firestone’s example, “Why do 
we donate to charity?”. Classical psychological explanations would resort to positing 
different kinds of goals here (e.g. maintaining a good reputation). Though useful in 
daily life, such explanations also tend towards circularity, and fail to resolve the hard 
question of teleology. (“Why do we do charitable things? Because we want to act 
charitably.”). But PP has the power to go further, to ‘dissect teleology’. This is because 
the inferential tools of PP provide a (Bayesian) method for learning our goals and 
preferences, and for learning when to be driven to action by optimistic predictions 
and when to update our beliefs instead.  
 
Both the idiosyncrasies in—and the contextual fluidity of—our goals and choices are 
often overlooked in classical motivation theories. These tend to assume a set of 
intuitively plausible, allegedly fixed and universal goals (such as autonomy, status, 
etc). However, few of our actual goals are absolute. Goals, like expectations, vary in 
their imperviousness to evidence. Their direction of fit, whether mind-to-world (i.e 
belief-like) or world-to-mind (i.e. goal-like), is a constant negotiation, rather than set 
in stone. This negotiation crucially depends on estimated confidence (precisions) in 
the attainability of expected states using one’s actions (control states in PP speak) 
[see Box 1]. For example, a child that sees herself as a math whiz (goal), who 
discovers they are not that good at math, updates her prior expectations, making  
something goal-like into something belief-like. Often, we infer who we are—our 
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values and goals—from our (inter)actions, decisions, and resulting observations, 
rather than the other way around [9]. The point here is not to belittle the importance 
of goals in driving behavior, but rather to emphasize the bidirectional influences 
needed to really explain behavior.  
 
Box 1: Creating and dissolving goals by precision tuning 
How do goals and motivations emerge under predictive processing? This translates 
directly into asking how certain predictions accrue high precision. Some deep-set 
homeostatic predictions come with innate, high precision. Often precision is accrued 
(through Bayesian learning) by repeating an action, as for habits. Other times beliefs 
take on precision by social learning, as when we come to adopt the goals and 
expectations from parents or peers.  There are no fixed hierarchies here: In the case 
of the hunger striker or the martyr, social or ideological expectations have been 
conferred (temporary) higher precision than interoceptive ones. Finally, goal 
adoption is facilitated by positive rates of error minimisation (doing better than 
expected at minimising error), and expectations of positive slopes of error reduction 
act as yet another force causing us to prefer rich environments over darkened rooms 
[10]. Overall, PP equips agents with an initially unwarranted level of confidence 
(precision) on the attainability of favorable outcomes, necessary to disclose the very 
conditions of their (fallible) realization. Computationally, this is expressed in the view 
of planning-as-inference, which firmly assumes the observation (fulfillment) of the 
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desired outcomes, and from there infers which behaviors (policies) would ‘generate’ 
those favorable outcomes with the greatest certainty [11]. 
 
The PP story makes highly testable claims. Once we define an organism and  niche, 
designating initial bodily (including neural) structure and capabilities, and thereby 
seeding them with initial expectations about the kinds of state they should inhabit—
given their viability conditions—everything else must follow from the attempt to 
minimize long-term prediction error. At that point, the story delivers specific 
predictions, including predictions about how they will act, how they will resolve 
apparent belief/desire conflicts, and how they will update their expectations given 
new sensory evidence. It is traditional accounts that then seem underconstrained and 
hard to falsify, since they posit a duplicitous and degenerate duality, in the form of 
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